We shall present some relations between consistency and re ection principles which explain why is G odel's incompleteness theorem wrongly used to argue that thinking machines are impossible.
Introduction
Since its publishing G odel's incompleteness theorem attracted a lot of attention among philosophers. In 1959 Lucas 8] presented an argument that this theorem implies that human thinking is essentially di erent from what any machine can do. This means that the ultimate goal of arti cial intelligence cannot be achieved. The argument is roughly the following. A machine (nowadays we would rather say \a computer") behaves according to xed rules (a program), hence we can view it as a formal system. Applying G odel's theorem to this system we get a true sentence which is unprovable in the system. Thus the machine does not know that the sentence is true while we can see that it is true.
The spectrum of attitudes of various people to this argument was nicely characterized by Hofstadter 5, page 472] : \Some size onto it as a nearly religious proof of the existence of souls, while others laugh it o as being unworthy of comment". Lucas's argument has been criticized several times. In particular, in his famous book 5] Hofstadter analyzed it in details and gave several founded counterarguments. Still in 1989 and 1994 Penrose published two books 9, 10] where he defended the thesis of Lucas. 2 He went even further and concluded that there must be some physical phenomena that our brains make use of and which we do not know yet. Especially in the second book he analyzed the argument in details and took pains to consider and dismiss many possible counterarguments.
It seems that most logicians agree on that G odel's theorem is not relevant to the question whether an intelligent machine can be constructed. Curiously enough, they do not agree so well on what is wrong with Lucas's argument. In his crushing review of the second Penrose's book, Putnam 12] argues, loosely interpreting his argument, that a computer program simulating human intelligence must be extremely complex, thus we cannot completely appreciate it and produce a true independent sentence. However, one can argue that already some present programs and chips are extremely complex and nobody can be sure that they do not contain a serious bug. Still we (more precisely those who designed them) know what they were intended for. Then, assuming that they were produced correctly and they are supposed to prove sentences, we can easily produce an unprovable true sentence.
The main argument of Hofstadter is based on the distinction between the system to which we apply G odel's theorem and the system in which we perform the argument. This is the basic distinction between a theory and metatheory in logic, which is inevitable, if we do not want to run into trivial inconsistencies. A person reasoning about a machine knows the machine completely, thus there is nothing surprising in being able to produce something that the machine cannot prove. This is completely symmetric with respect to interchanging the roles of the mind and the machine, therefore we cannot conclude that they are di erent. It is not possible to produce such statements, however, if a subject reasons about itself.
Still, our personal experience seems to suggest that we can somehow \step out" and avoid G odel's theorem. In order to explain this, one could refer to the tremendous complexity of the human mind, to its inconsistency, vagueness and possibly other de ciencies. But let us consider just mathematical thinking. Actually G odel's sentence is not just some nonsensical statement, even if it is constructed for a very complex system. It expresses the consistency of the system, which is a clear mathematical statement. In mathematics people do also a lot of mistakes, but, in principle, their mathematical reasoning is exact. Thus vagueness and inconsistency of human thinking does not explain it. The argument using complexity can be rejected as well, since the consistency of the system depends only on the mathematical assumptions that people use, not on the amount and complexity of the results they use. As far as the basic assumptions are concerned, almost all mathematicians use just a part of ZFC and all the axioms of ZFC (more precisely, axiom schemas) can be written on a single page. To produce an independent sentence for a human mind or a computer, we do not have to analyze it in its whole complexity, we only need to know the set theoretical assumptions that it uses. This shows that the relevant question is what mathematical statements we are willing to accept as intuitively true. This question has been considered by many logicians. It has been studied quite formally in proof theory and systems which should capture our mathematical assumptions have been proposed, 2,3,6]. Naturally, the incompleteness phenomenon plays a key role also there. Hilbert 4] proposed to develop all mathematics using only nite means. It is very di cult to characterize such nitism. Kreisel 6] argued that \if the notion of nitist proof is capable of formalization at all, its proof predicate must be not recognizable as such by nitist means". Let us note that the argument demonstrating this thesis refers to G odel's theorem in a similar same way as Lucas's.
In this note I will concentrate on the phenomenon, or rather illusion, that we can always extend our assumptions by a true independent sentence. This is something that should be carefully analysed independently on ones attitude to Lucas type arguments. (If, for instance, one believes that human mind is superior to any arti cial device, because of some unknown phenomena, one can get at least some hints about the new phenomena in this way.) My explanation will be very simple: when arguing that the new system is consistent, we use unconsciously a stronger assumption. Still, I think that writing down explicitly the assumptions and relationships between them will help to clarify the subject.
Preliminaries
Our base theory, denoted by B, will be I 1 . This particular choice of a theory is not essential, one can take, for instance PA (Peano arithmetic), or I 0 +Exp (with some arguments slightly modi ed). If not stated otherwise, all theorems are claimed to be provable in B.
By a theory we mean any recursively axiomatizable set of sentences in some language. In this paper we shall consider only extensions of B. If a theory is given by an in nite set of axioms, the way it is presented may in uence provability of its consistency etc. Thus to be quite precise we shall identify a theory with an index of a recursively enumerable set.
For a natural number n, we denote by n the numeral n, i.e. a suitable closed term representing n; the standard approach is to take the term S n (0), where S is the successor function. The g odel number of a formula ' will be denoted by d'e; for a formula ' with a free variable x, we denote by d'( _ x)e the g odel number of ' with the free variable replaced by the numeral representing x. This is a formalization of the function n 7 ! g odel number of '(n). This function cannot be expressed by an arithmetical term in the usual language of arithmetic, but, for sake of simplicity of notation, we shall use it in formulas as a term. ? denotes a suitable contradiction, say 0 = 1. As usual, T + ' denotes the theory T extended by the axiom '.
We shall denote by Prf T (x; y) a natural formalization of the relation \x is a proof of y in T". Pr T (y) denotes 9x Prf T (x; y), i.e. the provability predicate of T. The naturalness means that the fact that the proof predicate is closed under logical rules can be proved in B. In order to reduce the number of parentheses we shall abbreviate the formula Pr T (d'e) by Pr T d'e. The formalization of the consistency of T will be denoted by Con T , it is the formula :Pr T d?e. The re ection principle for T, denoted by Rfn T , is the schema Pr T d'e ! ' for every sentence ' in the language of T. The re ection principle for T restricted to a class of sentences ? will be denoted by denoted by ?-Rfn T .
The uniform re ection principle for T, denoted by RFN T , is the schema 8x (Pr T d'( _ x)e ! '(x)) for every sentence ' in the language of T. The uniform re ection principles restricted to classes of formulas n and n are equivalent to sentences (namely, the uniform re ection for the corresponding universal formula), therefore they will be treated as such.
We shall use some well-known results on re ection principles. 
1-Con T`C on T+Con T :
Rosser sentence for T is clearly implied by , thus (1) implies that it is not provable in T assuming T is consistent. Moreover :Ro T is unprovable using only Con T ; formally
Con T ! Con T+Ro T :
Note that Rosser sentence, the consistency and 1 re ection are of increasing strength and this hierarchy can be extended by taking n re ection schemas for n = 2; 3; : : :. 3 The illusion of perpetual adding consistency G odel's theorem implies that the rule from Con T deduce Con T+Con T
is not consistent with any su ciently strong theory S. More precisely, we need that S proves the consistency of some theory for which it proves G odel's theorem . This is true, say, for I 1 , which proves Con I 0 +Exp , but also for weaker theories. To prove this claim, let T 0 be a theory for which we have S`Con T 0 . Take T = T 0 + :Con T 0 ; it is consistent by G odel's theorem .
But T + Con T is not consistent, since T proves that a subtheory of T is not consistent. Let us stress that (4) has the weakest possible form, since we apply it only for explicit theories.
By the same argument such a rule is inconsistent also for stronger sentences.
(Note, however, that it does not make sense for schemas, such as Rfn T , since the corresponding rule would have in nitely many assumptions.) Namely, in case of Con we have derived a contradiction using (1) . To prove that the above rule is contradictory for n -RF N T , we shall check that the corresponding sentence is true for n -RF N T .
Lemma 2 n -RF N T ! n -RFN T+: n-RF N T .
Proof. Assume n -RF N T . We need to prove, for a n formula '(x), 8x (Pr T d: n -RF N T ! '( _ x)e ! '(x)): Let x be given. Instead of Pr T d: n -RFN T ! '( _ x)e we shall use a weaker assumption by taking only one special case of n -RF N T , namely
The formula within the outer d e reduces (using propositional calculus) so that we get Let us analyze now the intuitive argument that we can add the consistency Con T+Con T when we already know Con T . The usual argument goes roughly as follows: Suppose :Con T+Con T , i.e. T proves :Con T . Since T is true, there is an actual proof of contradiction from the axioms T. But this is in contradiction with our assumption Con T .
It is clear that this argument uses an additional assumption that T is \true", whatever it means. This word appears in Lucas's argument 8, p. 117], while Penrose uses \sound" 10, pp. 75,94]. The way these words are used shows that their meaning is some version of the re ection principle for T. The weakest re ection principle (of those we have considered) which su ces for this argument is 1 -Rfn T . Since 1 -Rfn T is equivalent to 1-Con T , the argument is simply showing a half of G odel's theorem , as expressed by the formula (2).
The fact (2) does not su ce to continue with adding more and more consistencies, but it is not di cult to prove a slightly stronger statement (we shall prove it formally below) 1-Con T`1 -Con T+Con T : (5) This explains the illusion that we have the power to add consistencies for ever. If we start with some theory T 0 and assume 1-Con T 0 , then we can prove Con T 0 , Con T 0 +Con T 0 , Con T 0 +Con T 0 +Con T 0 ; : : : ; but, of course, using the assumption 1-Con T 0 which is stronger than all these statements. I conjecture that assuming a little more, namely 1 -RF N T , we can extend this process to trans nite autonomous progressions (in the sense of 1]).
A possible source of misunderstanding may also be the fact that similar implications hold on various levels. For instance (3) is of this form. It enables us to iterate Rosser sentences, assuming the consistency of the initial theory. So the di erence between the Rosser sentence, consistency (the G odel sentence), !-consistency and other possible variations is important, if we want to avoid false conclusions. This distinction is often disregarded in informal descriptions of G odel's theorem .
Let us state and prove such implications for some principles that we have considered. The general form of these statements is X T ! X T+Y T (6) where X is the stronger and Y is the weaker principle. It is plausible that similar relations hold for other principles.
Proposition 3 (1) Con T ! Con T+Ro T ; (2) To prove (3), rst observe that 1-Con T implies Con T . We shall use the fact that 1-Con T is equivalent to 1 -Rfn T . Assume 1 -Rfn T and suppose Pr T+Con T d'e for some ' in 1 . This means Pr T dCon T ! 'e. The sentence inside is also 1 , hence we get Con T ! '. Now, using Con T we get '. To prove (4) assume !-Con T and suppose Pr T+Con T d9x'(x)e. This means Pr T dCon T ! 9x'(x)e. We shall rewrite this formula as Pr T d9x(Prf T (x; d?e) _ (Con T^' (x)))e:
Applying !-consistency of T to this formula we get 9x:Pr T d:Prf T ( _ x; d?e)^:(Con T^' ( _ x))e:
Fix such an x. The consistency of T implies :Prf T (x; d?e This proves that !-consistency holds for T + Con T . 2 
Conclusions
If we always justify a weaker principle by a stronger one, we are inevitably lead to so strong principles their truth is not evident to us. Consider for instance the hierarchy of the re ection principles n -RF N T . The next step after all these principles is the uniform re ection principle for all arithmetical formulas 1 0 -RFN T . In order to state this principle we need to be able to de ne the truth for all arithmetical formulas, which cannot be done in rst order arithmetic. We need at least a fragment of the second order arithmetic. This is a big step. Natural numbers seem much more accessible to our intuition than subsets of natural numbers. The problem of the truth of the Continuum Hypothesis and several other problems about the continuum have not been resolved yet. Though these undecidable sentences are not directly linked with the re ection principle, it shows that we cannot be so con dent anymore. As this is only a tiny part of the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, most people would go on, but at some stage everybody has to admit that the next principle is less likely to be true than the previous ones.
One of the arguments that Penrose uses is that whenever we accept T as our belief we accept also the soundness of T. He does not specify what exactly he means by the soundness. The only way to state it precisely that I see is to use some re ection principles. There is no theory which is closed o with respect to extensions by some re ection principle. As explained above we can expand T by taking stronger and stronger re ection principles, but at some point the principles will become too strong to be considered as obvious extensions of T. In the same way as people disagree on which set theory is safely consistent, people may disagree what extensions of an accepted theory T should be considered safe.
Thus it seems that our mathematical assumptions have a hierarchical structure like any other knowledge that we use. On the bottom there are statements that we believe are true without any doubts, while on the top there are doubtful statements which we have not been able to refute yet. We use less secure knowledge as a heuristic to guess the truth where we are not able to deduce it from more secure knowledge and data. (In our real life we mostly trust to our vision; when we cannot see the thing ourselves we may trust to somebody's report on it etc.) There are only a few, rather extravagant, logicians who doubt the consistency of Peano Arithmetic. On the opposite end the strongest assumptions are studied in set theory as large cardinals. The consistency of the largest ones is de nitely more doubtful than the consistency of Peano Arithmetic, as at least in one case a proposed seemingly natural cardinal assumption had to be rejected as inconsistent.
